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Abstract: This paper estimates spillover effects from a spatially-targeted 
redevelopment program, the Federal Empowerment Zone (EZ), on 
neighboring and economically similar areas. EZs are a set of generous tax 
incentives and grants aimed at small, economically depressed areas of large 
U.S. cities. We find areas that border or are economically similar to EZ 
locations experience a decline in the number of establishments and 
employment compared to areas that border or are similar to rejected EZ 
applicants. We also demonstrate that using spillover prone areas to estimate 
program effects causes upward bias when the spillover is negative. We find 
that for many of our estimates, spillovers more than offset positive program 
effects, although there are instances when the net effect is small and positive. 
1. Introduction 
It is common practice for state and local governments in the 
United States to offer incentives aimed at encouraging economic 
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redevelopment. The U.S. Federal Government is also involved in 
spatially-targeted economic redevelopment by designating tax 
incentives and grants through the Empowerment Zone (EZ) program. 
The EZ program designates parts of cities where the federal 
government offers generous incentives for establishments to relocate 
and invest; the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
estimates the program's annual value at $11 billion.1 Federal 
involvement in spatially targeted economic development raises 
concerns about the efficiency of such activity. One concern is that 
spatially targeted redevelopment policy may result in spillovers on 
neighboring or competing areas. Despite the growing number of 
evaluations of spatially targeted redevelopment policies, most of the 
previous literature ignores the potential for these programs to cause 
spillover effects in neighboring areas; with the notable exceptions of 
Dye and Merriman (2000), Weber et al. (2007), Chirinko and Wilson 
(2008), Neumark and Kolko (2010), and Ham et al. (2011). 
This paper empirically tests to what extent the Federal 
Empowerment Zone program causes spillovers on neighboring and 
economically close areas. In theory, spillover effects could be positive 
or negative. If spatially targeted policies are successful at attracting 
establishments from outside the immediate area or creating new 
establishments and new jobs there may be a positive effect on 
neighboring areas through the forces of agglomeration. Spillover 
effects could also be negative if the incentives offered by the program 
cause establishments to leave neighboring areas in favor of the 
targeted area, or if establishments and jobs in neighboring areas are 
destroyed through competition from targeted areas. If spatially 
targeted incentives cause spillovers, these effects should be 
considered in any analysis of these policies. In addition, because many 
evaluations of spatially targeted redevelopment policies use areas that 
are either geographically or economically close as a control group, 
understanding spillovers informs the methodology used to evaluate 
policy. If spillovers occur on comparison areas used as a benchmark 
for evaluation, the estimated effects of policy are biased, as the 
presence of spillovers violates the no interference assumption between 
treatment and control groups necessary for policy evaluation 
(Rosenbaum, 2007).2 
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To test for spillover effects from the EZ program, we compare 
how outcomes in areas that are close to the EZ designated areas 
changed with the introduction of the program, relative to the change 
for areas that are close to rejected applicants of the program. We test 
for spillovers using geographically close groups that share a census 
tract border with either the actual EZ areas or rejected applicants. We 
also test for spillovers using economically close groups along several 
dimensions, including those that met the criteria for eligibility under 
the program, and those that are similar along multiple dimensions as 
measured by a propensity score. 
Using data from the Dun and Bradstreet Marketplace database, 
we find that areas sharing a common census tract border with EZ 
locations experience a decline of as many as 16 establishments in the 
short term (1 year after the program starts) compared to areas that 
border the rejected applicants. The negative spillover from the EZ 
program grows to a loss of as many as 20 establishments in the longer 
term (5 years). We find similar negative spillover effects on 
establishments in areas that are economically close to EZ locations. 
Losses are especially strong in the retail and service sector, where 
previous research shows nearly all new establishment gains in 
targeted areas occur. Employment at establishments in geographically 
close areas also declines, by as much as 90 employees in the short 
term and 264 in the longer term. Employment losses are larger in 
economically similar areas, with estimates showing as many as 430 
jobs lost in these areas in the long term. We demonstrate that using 
spillover prone areas as a comparison group to estimate program 
effects produces results that suggest substantial gains in the number 
of establishments in targeted areas. Most of our estimates suggest 
that the size of the spillovers more than offsets gains from the 
program, although there are instances where the net effect is still 
small and positive. 
The remainder of the paper starts by discussing the advantages 
of using the Federal Empowerment Zone to study spillover effects of 
spatially targeted economic redevelopment policy. Section 3 outlines 
our identification strategy. Section 4 describes the data we use to 
estimate the spillover effects of EZs on establishment location in 
surrounding areas. Section 5 discusses our empirical results, and the 
final section of the paper offers concluding comments. 
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2. Why use the Federal Empowerment Zone to 
examine spillovers? 
The Federal Empowerment Zone program is a good candidate to 
examine potential spillover effects for several reasons. First, the 
program clearly defines areas where incentives are available and the 
economic criteria for areas to be eligible for them, allowing 
identification of geographically and economically close areas that are 
likely to be prone to spillover effects.3 In 1994, EZ status was 
designated in parts of six cities (Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, 
New York, and Philadelphia/Camden), leaving ample time for the 
effects of the program to take hold and for data generation. 
Second, the EZ program offers generous incentives for 
establishments to locate in designated areas (and hire residents of 
those areas), and there is at least some evidence that the program 
was successful in improving targeted areas, although we would 
describe this evidence as mixed.4 The most robust finding, shown by 
Krupka and Noonan (2009), Hanson (2009), and Busso et al. (2010), 
is that the EZ increased local property values in an economically and 
statistically significant way. Oakley and Tsao (2006) find that some EZ 
areas experienced reduced poverty and unemployment, but overall 
they find no statistically significant positive outcomes for zone 
residents. Busso et al. (2010) report as much as a 19% increase in 
jobs available to zone residents; however, they find no measurable 
effect on wages. Hanson (2009) finds no effect of zone designation on 
the employment rate of zone residents. Ham et al. (2011) find that the 
federal EZ program is responsible for a substantial reduction in 
unemployment, increase in employment, and increase in wage and 
salary income for zone residents. Some results in Ham et al. (2011) 
rely on using areas that are geographically close to EZs as a 
comparison group, and the magnitude of the positive effects diminish 
considerably when excluding these areas from the comparison group.5 
In terms of establishment re-location, Hanson and Rohlin 
(2011a) find that the EZ is responsible for attracting new 
establishments to the area, and the effect is quite large for 
establishments in the retail (about 40 new establishments) and service 
(about 5 new establishments) sectors. In addition, Hanson and Rohlin 
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(2011b) find that the EZ is responsible for industry level churning of 
establishments in the EZ area—with retail and service establishments 
gaining share at the expense of other sectors. 
Third, the EZ program requires establishments to locate within 
the defined geographic area and hire residents of the same area. The 
incentives are a package of tax benefits that include up to a $3000 per 
employee tax credit for wages paid, and incentives for investment in 
capital.6 In addition to the tax benefits offered for establishments, local 
governments may issue tax exempt bonds to assist establishments in 
the purchase of property. Designation also came with a onetime 
allocation of $100 million in social service block grants for use in the 
designated area.7 For more detail on the incentives associated with EZ 
areas see Hanson (2009). 
Lastly, not all applicants are granted EZ status, making for a 
useful control/comparison group to study the spillover effects from 
designation on surrounding areas. Areas that applied for EZ 
designation but were rejected, received a less generous package of 
assistance called Enterprise Communities (EC). We use areas that 
were adjacent to the EC areas to build a counter-factual for what 
would have happened in areas that are adjacent to actual EZ areas. 
The fact that EC areas receive some benefits is advantageous for our 
purposes, as the department of Housing and Urban Development 
maintains a record of their borders. Importantly, the EC benefits were 
inconsequential with respect to the EZ benefits—not allowing use of 
the wage tax credit or all of the capital incentives, and receiving only 
$3 million in block grants, so any spillovers from being near them 
would likely be extremely small. 
3. Identifying spillover effects 
The primary concern with identifying spillovers from economic 
redevelopment incentives is to construct a counter-factual for what 
would have happened to neighboring or economically close areas in 
the absence of the policy. We believe this makes the selection into 
treatment problem that is typical in this literature more tractable, as 
we do not have to deal with our treatment (the geographically and 
economically close areas) being selected because they are more/less 
likely to be successful in the absence of incentives.8 We measure 
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potential spillovers by the number of establishments and employment 
at establishments in areas close (geographically and economically) to 
EZ designated areas. We create control groups for the spillover areas 
using areas that were geographically and economically close to EC 
areas, (ECs applied for, but did not receive the EZ designation). There 
are four types of areas relevant to our identification strategy, 
summarized below: 
 EZ areas, census tracts where the incentives are actually 
available. 
 Census tracts near (either geographically or economically) EZ 
areas, where we test for spillovers. 
 EC areas, census tracts that applied for EZ status, but were 
denied and instead given a far less generous form of assistance. 
 Census tracts near (either geographically or economically) EC 
areas, we use these as the control group when testing for 
spillovers. 
Areas close to EC designations make a good control group for 
areas close to EZ designations. They are more similar than other 
census tracts based on observable 1990 census characteristics. In 
addition, areas adjacent to ECs are not likely subject to spillovers from 
the program because they are in different cities. Finally, areas 
adjacent to ECs probably share some of the same unobservable 
characteristics as areas adjacent to EZs because they were not 
included in the original application. 
In order to develop the counter-factual, first, we compare areas 
that are geographically close to EZ areas with areas that are 
geographically close to rejected applicants. The rejected applicants 
received a less-generous incentive package called Enterprise 
Communities. We fully expect that if the EC caused any type of 
spillover it would be substantially smaller than that caused by the EZ.9 
We map all EZ and EC areas using Geographic Information Systems 
software to identify census tracts that share a border with these areas. 
To give an example of EZs and spillover areas, Panel A of Fig. 1 shows 
the New York City EZ, and Panel B shows the surrounding area where 
we test for spillover effects. 
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Fig. 1. New York City Empowerment Zone, bordering, and qualified census 
tracts. 
Columns (1)–(3) of Table 1 show a comparison of average 1990 
census characteristics and the change in characteristics from 1980 to 
1990 for all census tracts, and areas geographically close to EZs and 
ECs (the comparison area). Table 1 shows that areas surrounding EZ 
designated areas were worse off in 1990 than all other tracts along 
several economic measures including poverty rates, unemployment, 
residents with a college degree, median income, home ownership, and 
the percent receiving some form of public assistance. They also tended 
to have a larger percentage of non-whites and female headed 
households, and an older housing stock. Table 1 also shows that areas 
near EZs had higher growth in poverty and unemployment, while 
having slower growth in median income, and the percentage of 
residents with a college degree than all other census tracts. 
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Table 1. Spill over and comparison area summary statistics (standard 
deviation in parenthesis). 
 All tracts Geographi
cally close 
to EZ 
Geographic
ally close 
to EC 
Qualified for 
assistance 
(EZ cities) 
Qualified 
for 
assistance 
(EC cities) 
Propensity 
score 90th 
percentile 
(EZ cities) 
Propensity 
score 90th 
percentile 
(EC cities) 
Poverty rate 
1990 
0.1305 0.3174 0.2199 0.3688 0.3288 0.4509 0.3131 
(0.1188) (0.186) (0.1462) (0.132) (0.1196) (0.2459) (0.2591) 
∆ in poverty 
rate 1980–
1990 
0.0405 0.0278 0.0282 0.0387 0.0789 0.0742 0.0611 
(0.0964) (0.1191) (0.0956) (0.1223) (0.0948) (0.18) (0.1776) 
Unemploymen
t rate 1990 
0.0665 0.1603 0.0986 0.1848 0.1379 0.1887 0.1302 
(0.0493) (0.1067) (0.0684) (0.0927) (0.0678) (0.1527) (0.1336) 
∆ in 
unemployment 
rate 1980–
1990 
0.014 0.0197 0.0132 0.0364 0.0399 0.0482 0.0436 
(0.0486) (0.0730) (0.0598) (0.0846) (0.0636) (0.1292) (0.1043) 
Percent non-
white 1990 
0.1988 0.6784 0.4296 0.772 0.5684 0.8437 0.7471 
(0.2569) (0.3397) (0.3356) (0.246) (0.302) (0.2002) (0.2893) 
∆ in percent 
non-white 
1980–1990 
− 0.1225 0.0629 0.0599 0.0926 0.0812 0.0748 0.0523 
(0.3759) (0.1284) (0.1242) (0.1372) (0.1317) (0.2321) (0.1788) 
Percent with 
college degree 
1990 
0.2152 0.1379 0.179 0.092 0.1097 0.0563 0.1089 
(0.1622) (0.1755) (0.1573) (0.0899) (0.1061) (0.0943) (0.1384) 
∆ in percent 
with college 
degree 1980–
1990 
0.0568 0.0377 0.0463 0.0284 0.0142 0.0047 0.0195 
(0.0688) (0.0808) (0.0725) (0.0544) (0.0569) (0.0741) (0.0755) 
Median income 
(thousands) 
1990 
49.1 32.1 38.4 26.4 27.2 14.2 16.6 
(22.3) (23.9) (19.1) (11.7) (10.1) (16.1) (15.6) 
∆ in median 
income 
(thousands) 
1980–1990 
12.1 3.2 4.3 1.6 − 1.2 − 1.1 − 2.1 
(15.7) (13.9) (13.1) (10.3) (9.32) (18.6) (12.5) 
Home 
ownership rate 
1990 
0.6525 0.3385 0.4717 0.2821 0.3787 0.1105 0.3041 
(0.2226) (0.2346) (0.2344) (0.2138) (0.2188) (0.1466) (0.2131) 
∆ in home 
ownership rate 
1980–1990 
− 0.0178 0.0086 − 0.0123 0.0001 − 0.0186 − 0.0049 − 0.0162 
(0.0937) (0.0966) (0.079) (0.0857) (0.0683) (0.1057) (0.0668) 
Median house 
value 
(thousands) 
1990 
117.8 74.8 103.4 92.2 79.9 37.2 52.8 
(111) (97.9) (88.2) (99.4) (73) (60.3) (67) 
∆ in median 
house value 
(thousands) 
1980–1990 
130.9 78.7 104.7 94.5 80.3 48.9 74.2 
(117.1) (98.9) (87.4) (99.3) (72.7) (63) (68.9) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 1990 
0.217 0.5053 0.3668 0.5644 0.4446 0.5217 0.3643 
(0.1513) (0.256) (0.205) (0.1888) (0.1901) (0.3285) (0.3165) 
∆ in percent 
female 
household 
heads 1980–
1990 
0.0669 0.0713 0.0556 0.0798 0.081 0.0514 0.0447 
(0.1109) (0.1599) (0.137) (0.1531) (0.1351) (0.1839) (0.1478) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
0.0761 0.2398 0.1318 0.2788 0.1861 0.3328 0.183 
(0.0769) (0.1648) (0.1066) (0.1294) (0.1079) (0.2157) (0.1823) 
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 All tracts Geographi
cally close 
to EZ 
Geographic
ally close 
to EC 
Qualified for 
assistance 
(EZ cities) 
Qualified 
for 
assistance 
(EC cities) 
Propensity 
score 90th 
percentile 
(EZ cities) 
Propensity 
score 90th 
percentile 
(EC cities) 
assistance 
1990 
∆ in percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
1980–1990 
0.0162 0.0038 0.0039 0.0021 0.0255 0.0085 0.0255 
(0.0570) (0.0964) (0.0653) (0.0977) (0.0721) (0.1360) (0.0911) 
Average age 
of housing 
stock 1990 
27.7423 41.2193 36.1745 40.6058 35.2956 36.446 35.4346 
(11.0603
) 
(8.488) (9.5766) (8.259) (9.7267) (9.1787) (9.2801) 
∆ in average 
age of housing 
stock 1980–
1990 
5.0741 4.82 5.874 4.8968 5.6032 2.7337 5.7561 
(4.3157) (5.3725) (4.6468) (5.4889) (4.6782) (7.3061) (6.0654) 
Notes: Data from 1980 and 1990 census tract areas. Geographically close areas are 
adjacent to EZ and EC boundaries according to HUD definitions of these areas. 
Given the large differences between areas surrounding EZs and 
other census tracts, finding a comparison group that is similar along 
observables will help reduce bias when estimating spillovers.10 Areas 
surrounding the rejected applicants (EC areas) were more similar to 
areas surrounding EZs before the program began than other census 
tracts, although they were still better off along the dimensions we 
measure. In addition, areas surrounding ECs changed in a similar 
manner to EZs between 1980 and 1990, especially relative to all 
census tracts. 
Our strategy to identify spillovers is to compare census tracts 
close to EZs with those close to ECs, and measure outcomes before 
the program began and after the program took effect. This amounts to 
a difference-in-difference estimation, with the following econometric 
specification: 
ΔY = α + β1(EZgeo) + X
′δ + ε, if EZgeo or ECgeo = 1 
equation(1) 
 
where ∆Y represents the change in the number of establishments or 
the number of employees at establishments between 1994 (one year 
before the program started) and 1996 (one year after the program 
started), we also estimate a longer term impact by taking the 
difference between 1994 and 2000.11 EZgeo is a dummy variable that 
equals one when the census tract borders an EZ area and zero 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
Regional Science and Urban Economics, Vol. 43, No. 1 (2013): pg. 86-100. DOI. This article is © Elsevier and permission 
has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Elsevier does not grant permission for this 
article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express permission from Elsevier. 
10 
 
otherwise. X includes city-fixed effects as well as a set of pre-
treatment characteristics of census tracts including: the poverty rate, 
unemployment rate, percent non-white, percent with a college degree, 
median income, home ownership rate, median home value, percent of 
female headed households, percent receiving public assistance, 
average age of housing stock and average age of housing stock 
squared, and the 1980–1990 change in all of these variables. Because 
we are concerned about correlation between the control variables and 
proximity to an EZ causing bias in our estimate of β1 we estimate 
Eq. (1) with and without the X variables. We estimate Eq. (1) using 
only census tracts that either border an EZ or border an EC—excluding 
all other census tracts (also excluding actual EZ and EC areas). 
Eq. (1) tests for spillovers from the EZ program in areas that 
are geographically close to designated areas, but we would also like to 
test for spillovers in areas that are economically close to the EZ areas. 
To do this, we need two groups of census tracts, one that is 
economically close to EZ areas and is likely subject to spillover effects 
and another group that is a control/comparison group not subject to 
spillover effects. As with the geographically close spillover prone areas, 
we choose economically close areas from within EZ cities and the 
control/comparison areas from EC cities. We define economically close 
areas in two different ways: those that qualified according to the 
criteria of the EZ program, and areas that were most similar to those 
included in the zone according to pre-treatment characteristics (using 
a propensity score model). 
The first definition of areas that are economically close to 
treatment areas uses the criteria for eligibility under the program. 
According to the rules of the program, EZ applicants must have at 
least 20% of residents living in poverty and at least a 6.3% 
unemployment rate. We test the spillover effects on areas that were 
qualified and part of the same city as an EZ, but not included in EZ 
areas by comparing them with areas that were qualified and part of 
the same city as an EC, but not included in EC areas. Panel C of Fig. 1 
shows an example of the New York City EZ and the qualified but 
excluded census tracts we use to test for spillovers. 
These areas may be particularly prone to spillovers from the 
program because although they qualified for EZ status, localities chose 
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not to include them in the application. They may draw from the same 
workforce, or service the same customer base as EZ areas, or they 
may be in direct competition for establishments. Columns (4) and (5) 
of Table 1 show how similar areas that qualified for EZ status but were 
not included in the initial application are across our control and 
treatment cities. Notice that the qualified areas in our control cities 
(areas that qualified for EZ, but reside in an EC city) are more similar 
to the spillover prone areas than all other tracts along all observable 
dimensions. 
Our estimating equation to test for spillover effects using the 
group of tracts that qualified for EZ status, but did not receive 
incentives is: 
ΔY = α + β1(EZqual) + X
′δ + ε, if EZqual or ECqual = 1 
equation(2) 
 
where EZqual equals one if the census tract is in a city with an EZ, and 
is qualified, and zero otherwise. We use only tracts that met the 
eligibility criteria under the program and are located in cities with an 
EZ or EC. 
The second definition of economically close areas uses a 
propensity score model to identify areas that are similar to the actual 
EZ along several dimensions prior to EZ designation; we use these 
areas to test for possible spillovers from the program. To construct a 
control/comparison group we use areas that were similar to EC areas 
prior to designation along the same dimensions. 
We implement this strategy in two steps; the first is to estimate 
a propensity score model using pre-treatment data to find 
characteristics associated with applying for an EZ, and the second is to 
find areas that were most similar to actual applicants. We do this 
individually for each city in our sample, so the spillover and 
comparison areas are city specific. We estimate the following linear 
probability model separately for each city in our sample to create 
propensity scores12: 
EZ = α + X′δ + ε  
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equation(3) 
 
where EZ is a zero/one variable indicating EZ status in cities that 
received an EZ and EC status in cities that did not. X includes the 
unemployment rate, percent of non-white residents, percent of 
residents with a college degree, median income of the census tract, 
the homeownership rate, median house value, percent of female 
headed households, percent of residents receiving public assistance, 
median age of the housing stock, and median age of the housing stock 
squared. All variables are measured prior to EZ designation in 1990 
and the unit of observation is the census tract. 
Table 2 shows sample output for estimating Eq. (2) for a select 
group of cities. As Table 2 shows, the variables that best predict EZ/EC 
status differ by city. In both Chicago and New York the percentage of 
residents living in poverty, and the percent that are non-white are 
significant predictors of EZ status, while in Atlanta none of the 
variables are significant. In EC cities, poverty is also a good predictor 
of being included in the application, while race is not. Other predictors 
matter more in EC cities, such as the homeownership rate and the 
percent of residents receiving public assistance. These results highlight 
the lack of continuity in choosing which census tracts became part of 
the application for the program, a fact that we believe suggests that 
there may be important unobservable influences driving the selection 
process. 
Table 2. Linear probability model results for select cities. 
 
Empowerment zone cities 
 
Enterprise community cities 
 
New York Chicago Atlanta LA Houston DC 
Poverty rate 
0.213*** 0.189* 0.611 0.703*** 0.419** 1.417*** 
(0.0516) (0.112) (0.437) (0.120) (0.170) (0.372) 
Unemployment 
rate 
− 0.0399 0.234* 0.631 1.207*** − 0.0250 − 1.244** 
(0.0760) (0.139) (0.715) (0.283) (0.324) (0.545) 
Percent non-
white 
0.0376** − 0.0911** 0.0925 0.00917 0.0113 − 0.0586 
(0.0162) (0.0434) (0.201) (0.0447) (0.0540) (0.212) 
Percent with 
college degree 
− 0.0146 − 0.0492 − 0.324 0.293*** − 0.0362 − 0.185 
(0.0338) (0.0860) (0.302) (0.0899) (0.0827) (0.257) 
Median income 
0.000480* − 0.000322 0.00149 − 0.000578 0.00161** − 0.000705 
(0.000250) (0.000779) (0.00173) (0.000545) (0.000798) (0.00132) 
Home ownership 
rate 
− 0.0234 − 0.134** − 0.248 0.369*** − 0.169*** 0.190 
(0.0198) (0.0592) (0.164) (0.0486) (0.0514) (0.134) 
Median house 
value 
− 8.94e−08*** − 6.98e−08 3.94e−07 1.54e−07** − 4.64e−08 1.74e−07 
(2.76e−08) (1.24e−07) (4.42e−07) (6.94e−08) (1.47e−07) (1.92e−07) 
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Empowerment zone cities 
 
Enterprise community cities 
 
New York Chicago Atlanta LA Houston DC 
Percent female 
household heads 
0.00146 0.0436 − 0.325 0.0782 − 0.0959 0.0835 
(0.0325) (0.0681) (0.303) (0.0926) (0.0960) (0.162) 
Percent 
receiving public 
assistance 
0.0255 0.368*** 0.415 1.574*** 0.835*** 0.226 
(0.0584) (0.122) (0.623) (0.164) (0.289) (0.473) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
0.00143 − 0.00506 − 0.0167 − 0.00939 − 0.0328*** 0.00464 
(0.00263) (0.00712) (0.0276) (0.00608) (0.00439) (0.0138) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
− 1.45e−05 1.69e−05 0.000380 0.000126 0.000756*** − 6.33e−05 
(3.52e−05) (9.54e−05) (0.000414) (9.76e−05) (8.45e−05) (0.000192) 
Constant 
− 0.0542 0.255* 0.126 − 0.417*** 0.244*** − 0.149 
(0.0521) (0.138) (0.489) (0.102) (0.0621) (0.343) 
N 2166 865 132 923 525 183 
R2 0.079 0.273 0.3 0.212 0.174 0.281 
Notes: Linear Results show characteristics associated with choice of inclusion in EZ 
application at the census tract level. Regressions use only tracts in the city where the 
application is made. 
***p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.1. 
**p < 0.05. 
We use the city specific beta coefficients from Eq. (2) to create 
a predicted value, or propensity score, and define our treatment and 
control areas based on those values. This approach follows the use of 
the propensity score by Crump et al. (2009) as a way to trim samples 
and estimate average treatment effects. We are searching for the 
sample that is most similar to the actual EZ/EC areas to check for 
spillover effects, so we define it by the propensity scores that are 
closest to the actual EZ/EC. We trim our sample using census tracts 
with a propensity score in the top decile of each city. 
Columns (6) and (7) of Table 1 show summary statistics for the 
areas that are economically close to EZ and EC areas using those in 
the top decile as the propensity score cut-off. As with using qualified 
but not chosen areas, the propensity score method helps to choose 
areas that were economically similar to the EZ areas before the 
program to test for spillovers. Columns (6) and (7) show that areas 
economically close to ECs are more similar to areas economically close 
to EZs than the All Tracts group. 
We also test to be sure that the propensity score areas are more 
similar to actual EZ and EC areas, than other areas in the city. Again, 
the point is to find areas that may be subject to spillovers from the EZ 
policy, and the propensity score does this by identifying areas that 
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were similar along a several dimensions prior to the arrival of the 
policy. Table 3 shows the results of propensity score balancing tests 
that suggest that the propensity score is picking areas that are most 
similar to actual EZ/EC areas. The third column of Table 3 shows the 
difference between actual EZ/ECs and all other census tracts in EZ/EC 
cities. This column shows that the differences are large—24 
percentage points difference in poverty rates, 22 percentage points 
non-white residents, for example. The final column of Table 3 tests the 
difference between actual EZ/ECs and the areas where we test for 
spillovers (those scoring in the top decile of the p-score distribution). 
Although the tests suggest that there are still some differences 
between these areas, the magnitude of the differences is substantially 
less—always in favor of the areas looking closer to EZ/ECs. We take 
the balancing test results as evidence that the propensity score is 
choosing areas that are similar to actual EZ/ECs, and that these areas 
are a reasonable place to look for spillovers from the policy. Unlike 
many applications of the propensity score, we are not using it as a 
method to identify a comparison area for policy evaluation; we are 
using it to identify areas that may be subject to spillovers from a 
policy. 
Table 3. Propensity score balancing test between actual EZ/EC areas and 
EZ/ECpscore areas. 
 
Actual 
EZ/EC 
Tracts in 
EZ/EC cities 
 
Tracts in top decile of 
EZ/ECpscore 
 
Poverty rate 0.4111 0.1671 0.2439*** 0.3844 0.0266*** 
Unemployment rate 0.1772 0.0851 0.0921*** 0.1604 0.0167*** 
Percent non-white 0.7087 0.3762 0.3324*** 0.7970 − 0.0883*** 
Percent with college 
degree 
0.0855 0.2319 − 0.1464*** 0.0801 0.0054 
Median income 
(thousands) 
22.03 47.61 − 25.57*** 15.36 6.67*** 
Home ownership rate 0.3053 0.4982 − 0.1929*** 0.1975 0.1077*** 
Median house value 68,621 141,557 − 72,936*** 44,763 23,858*** 
Percent female 
household heads 
0.5573 0.3020 0.2552*** 0.4457 0.1115*** 
Percent receiving public 
assistance 
0.2732 0.1055 0.1677*** 0.2605 0.0127 
Average age of housing 
stock 
37.87 33.81 4.06*** 35.98 1.88*** 
EZpscore indicates tracts that were in the top decile of the propensity score distribution 
for each EZ or EC city individually. Column (3) shows the results of significance tests 
between characteristics of actual EZ and EC areas and all other census tracts in cities 
with an EZ or EC. Column (5) shows results of significance tests between 
characteristics of actual EZ/EC areas and the EZ/ECpscore areas. Although there are still 
significant differences between EZ/EC and E/ECpscore areas, these are substantially 
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smaller than the difference between EZ/ECs and all other tracts in EZ/EC cities. *** 
p < 0.01. 
Our estimating equation to test for spillover effects using the 
group of tracts that were similar to EZ areas, but did not receive 
incentives is: 
ΔY = α + β1 (EZpscore) + X
′δ + ε, if EZpscore or ECpscore > Top Decile 
equation(4) 
 
where EZpscore equals one if the tract has a propensity score in the top 
decile of the city distribution. We estimate Eq. (4) using only tracts 
with a propensity score in the top decile and located in cities that 
received either an EZ or an EC. 
4. Data 
The unit of analysis in our data is the census tract, and our 
source for the number of establishments is the Dun and Bradstreet 
(D&B) Marketplace database.13 The data consist of the fourth quarter 
survey from the years 1994, 1996, and 2000. These data contain a 
wealth of establishment information, including employment, sales, 
years of service, the location of the establishment at the zip code 
level, and the two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) code. 
The D&B data is aggregated at the zip code level. To map the 
zip code level data on local establishments to census tracts, we use a 
correspondence to match the geography of the EZ and EC designated 
areas and our spillover prone areas. The correspondence determines 
what percent of each zip code lies in a given census tract and assigns 
that percent of zip code employment or establishments to the census 
tract. The list of EZ and EC census tracts was obtained by personal 
correspondence with the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, and is also partially available through their webpage. 
After mapping EZ and EC areas, we locate areas that border them 
using ArcGIS software. 
One advantage of using the D&B data over census data is that it 
is generated closer to the time when EZs are implemented (1995) than 
census data that is only available every ten years. Another advantage 
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is that establishments and employment in the D&B data are based on 
location of where work takes place, an explicit requirement for 
eligibility in the program.14 The program requires that establishments 
must locate in the EZ and employees must work (and live) in the EZ to 
claim tax credits. Although neither the census nor the D&B matches 
both where the employee live and work, the D&B offer a count of 
employees that actually work in the EZ. Census data only match where 
the employee lives, and given the small size of EZ areas it is likely that 
many residents are employed outside of the designated area. 
We supplement the D&B data with census data from the 1990 
census and changes from the 1980 to 1990 census to control for 
economic and demographic factors of the census tracts before 
designation in some specifications. We also use the 1990 census data 
to estimate our propensity score model to find areas that are 
economically close to actual EZ and EC areas based on several 
dimensions. 
5. Results 
5.1. Number of establishments 
Table 4 shows the results of estimating Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) 
using the number of business establishments as the dependent 
variable. Estimates include both short (one year) and long (five years) 
term intervals after the start of the program and we estimate with and 
without control variables. The first four columns show results for 
spillovers from the EZ program on geographically close areas, the next 
four show spillover results for areas that qualified for the program, but 
were not part of the application, and the final four columns show 
results for areas that were similar along multiple observed dimensions 
as measured by a propensity score.15 
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Table 4. Spillover effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
establishments (standard errors clustered at city level in parenthesis). 
Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
EZclose 
−24.23*
** 
− 15.21
** 
− 30.28*
** 
− 18.17*
** 
− 28.29*
** 
− 25.05*
** 
− 28.48*
** 
− 20.70*
** 
− 19.38
** 
− 27.96
* 
− 33.15*
** 
− 36.4
8 
(6.212) (6.808) (5.497) (5.761) (3.847) (6.425) (3.872) (6.003) (8.502) (15.99) (9.717) 
(22.58
) 
Poverty rate 
 63.10  58.16  10.38  30.71  246.6**  
211.5*
* 
 (50.58)  (40.42)  (54.53)  (48.99)  (99.54)  
(106.7
) 
Unemploym
ent rate 
 48.94  46.21  185.5***  142.6***  − 85.57  
− 51.5
4 
 (80.29)  (74.07)  (62.79)  (54.48)  (102.0)  
(86.60
) 
Percent non-
white 
 
− 29.29
** 
 
− 27.47*
** 
 8.501  6.136  46.73  47.50 
 (12.05)  (10.60)  (12.87)  (12.79)  (37.39)  
(57.00
) 
Percent with 
college 
degree 
 37.97  22.09  117.9**  93.26*  164.0*  185.8 
 (41.59)  (44.13)  (57.06)  (55.71)  (98.31)  
(113.5
) 
Median 
income 
 0.163  0.474  − 0.307  − 0.166  0.735  1.004 
 (0.528)  (0.458)  (0.901)  (0.875)  (1.163)  
(1.246
) 
Home 
ownership 
rate 
 
− 47.21
** 
 − 46.06*  − 36.03*  − 21.02  8.360  52.54 
 (23.51)  (25.71)  (18.56)  (21.05)  (45.68)  
(74.76
) 
Median 
house value 
 − 0.200  − 0.133  
− 0.308*
* 
 − 0.221  − 0.321  
− 0.56
5 
 (0.170)  (0.182)  (0.147)  (0.168)  (0.301)  
(0.496
) 
Percent 
female 
household 
heads 
 15.55  10.14  − 58.37  − 52.38  22.13  
− 13.3
7 
 (36.48)  (29.24)  (40.88)  (36.15)  (60.92)  
(76.92
) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 
− 135.3
** 
 
− 126.9*
* 
 
− 138.3*
** 
 
− 124.6*
** 
 
− 190.2
** 
 
− 116.
5 
 (64.49)  (57.13)  (44.46)  (38.38)  (92.32)  
(91.25
) 
Average age 
of housing 
stock 
 
− 5.162
* 
 − 5.757*  
− 5.051*
** 
 
− 6.779*
** 
 − 11.43  
− 17.1
5 
 (2.739)  (3.004)  (1.939)  (2.486)  (7.658)  
(14.46
) 
Average age 
of housing 
stock 
squared 
 0.0309  0.0367  0.0456*  0.0649**  0.138  0.201 
 
(0.0395
) 
 (0.0402)  (0.0250)  (0.0257)  
(0.0953
) 
 
(0.171
) 
Constant 
72.10*** 231.3*** 66.25*** 232.7*** 65.83*** 232.2*** 55.24*** 243.2*** 72.97*** 185.5 72.94*** 298.5 
(3.083) (48.90) (2.810) (53.56) (3.473) (58.76) (3.645) (69.67) (6.955) (125.2) (8.920) 
(227.0
) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 
1980 to 
1990 census 
trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observation
s 
2312 2225 2312 2225 3171 3089 3171 3089 694 470 694 470 
R-squared 0.101 0.105 0.058 0.128 0.076 0.084 0.053 0.071 0.135 0.137 0.082 0.099 
Notes: Regressions with EZgeo as treatment include only census tracts that border EZ 
(treatment) or EC (control) areas. Regressions with EZqual as treatment include only 
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census tracts that qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the 
program. To qualify, applicants must have at least 20% of residents living in poverty 
and at least a 6.3% unemployment. Regressions with EZpscore as treatment include 
only tracts in the top decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at the city 
level) that did not actually receive an EZ or EC. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1. 
Results estimated without controlling for other pre-treatment 
characteristics show that census tracts sharing a border with EZ 
designated areas experienced a decline of about 24 establishments in 
the short term and 30 establishments in the longer term, both 
statistically significant at the one percent level. Estimates controlling 
for 1990 census characteristics and the trend in these characteristics 
between 1980 and 1990, show a slightly more modest decline in the 
number of establishments for census tracts sharing a border with EZ 
designated areas, establishments in the short term and 18 
establishments over the longer term (statistically significant at 
conventional levels). 
Spillovers from the EZ program may also occur in areas not as 
geographically close, but economically (and demographically) similar 
to EZ areas. These may be areas that draw from the same workforce, 
or service the same customer base as EZ areas, or they may be in 
direct competition for establishments. The middle four columns of 
Table 4 show the results of estimating Eq. (2) to test for spillovers in 
areas that qualified for EZ status, but were not included in the local 
application. In the short term, areas that were qualified but not 
included in the EZ designated boundaries experience a decline of 
between 25 and 28 establishments (depending on controls for pre-
treatment characteristics and trends), statistically significant at the 
one percent level. The long term estimates suggest that qualified 
areas have a loss of between 20 and 28 establishments, depending on 
what controls are used, but statistical significance remains. 
As another way to check for the presence of spillovers from the 
EZ program on economically and demographically similar areas, we 
estimate spillover effects on areas that were most similar with areas 
receiving an EZ along several observable characteristics. We identify 
similar areas using the propensity score model in Eq. (2), and consider 
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all areas with a propensity score in the top decile of the distribution 
(specific to each city) as areas for potential spillovers. We estimate the 
spillover effects on census tracts that have a propensity score in the 
top decile, following Eq. (4), the last four columns of Table 4 show 
these results. Areas in the top decile of the propensity score 
distribution show a loss of between 19 and 33 establishments in the 
short term (depending on whether control variables are included), 
statistically significant at conventional levels. Longer term results show 
the negative spillover for census tracts in the top decile of the 
propensity score distribution grows to between 28 and 36 
establishments, but statistical significance at conventional levels is 
lost.16 
We also examine the possibility that spillovers are different in 
areas that are both geographically and economically close to EZs. This 
amounts to running regressions as in Eqs.  (1), (2) and (4), but using 
the interaction between EZGeo and either EZQual or EZpscore as the 
variable of interest. These results, available on request, show that 
spillovers in areas that are both geographically and economically close 
are larger in magnitude (statistical significance is the same) than the 
spillovers on tracts that are either geographically or economically 
close. In the short term, these areas lose additional 12–15 
establishments, and in the longer term, this difference shrinks to an 
additional loss of between 5 and 7 establishments. 
5.2. Number of employees 
Table 5 displays the results of estimating Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) 
using employment at business establishments located in spillover 
prone and comparison areas as the dependent variable. Again, we 
estimate a short (one year) and long (five year) term effect and 
produce estimates with and without control variables. As a group, 
these results are quite imprecise compared to the business 
establishment results, although they all suggest a negative spillover 
effect from the EZ program on employment in geographically and 
economically close areas. 
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Table 5. Spill-over effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
employees (standard errors clustered at city level in parenthesis). 
Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
Short term 
 
Long term 
 
EZclose 
− 219.5* − 52.39 − 476.8** − 185.4 − 335.4*** − 196.7 − 599.9*** − 483.1*** − 328.2 − 612.7 − 889.9** − 1223 
(123.2) (175.6) (207.0) (336.8) (95.80) (132.4) (144.1) (174.3) (235.3) (533.3) (361.3) (825.8) 
Poverty rate 
 203.1  1273  2390**  3380*  3391  4114 
 (925.3)  (1482)  (1177)  (1790)  (2566)  (3788) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 1293  3711  712.7  3873*  − 1929  − 483.2 
 (1950)  (3250)  (1653)  (2090)  (1721)  (3038) 
Percent non-
white 
 − 53.28  − 538.1*  77.88  − 244.2  1275  1595 
 (216.0)  (278.1)  (299.2)  (383.4)  (1412)  (2149) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 − 22.79  − 1773  − 3316  − 3358  1961  4321 
 (1459)  (2394)  (2093)  (2740)  (2591)  (3928) 
Median income 
 − 1.073  18.04  50.10*  70.36*  4.771  17.17 
 (12.42)  (19.63)  (29.62)  (42.54)  (30.97)  (45.74) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 − 1024  − 2386  − 610.3  − 1281  2013  2554 
 (914.3)  (1481)  (621.9)  (1022)  (1830)  (2899) 
Median house 
value 
 2.673  3.725  2.090  1.203  − 12.14  − 19.91 
 (5.702)  (9.785)  (4.885)  (8.584)  (11.98)  (18.32) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 − 402.2  − 84.79  − 83.81  670.5  634.5  1229 
 (676.4)  (940.1)  (804.4)  (1053)  (1914)  (2875) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 − 1506  − 4071*  − 1068  − 3516**  − 1780  − 3053 
 (1419)  (2361)  (1048)  (1549)  (2105)  (3789) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 − 89.16**  − 142.2**  − 91.73  − 173.3*  − 418.6  − 611.9 
 (43.16)  (70.71)  (58.92)  (89.09)  (351.8)  (545.1) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 0.753  1.307  0.713  1.552*  5.051  7.232 
 (0.641)  (1.033)  (0.684)  (0.820)  (4.141)  (6.425) 
Constant 
767.3*** 3459*** 1210*** 5311*** 587.7*** 1369 936.2*** 3025 792.2*** 6800 1435*** 10,330 
(78.58) (944.8) (113.4) (1437) (87.80) (1745) (140.1) (2717) (227.5) (5538) (353.3) (8566) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2312 2225 2312 2225 3171 3089 3171 3089 694 470 694 470 
R-squared 0.001 0.023 0.002 0.040 0.003 0.025 0.004 0.030 0.003 0.089 0.009 0.079 
Notes: Regressions with EZgeo as treatment include only census tracts that border EZ 
(treatment) or EC (control) areas. Regressions with EZqual as treatment include only 
census tracts that qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the 
program. To qualify, applicants must have at least 20% of residents living in poverty 
and at least a 6.3% unemployment. Regressions with EZpscore as treatment include 
only tracts in the top decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at the city 
level) that did not actually receive an EZ or EC. 
*p < 0.1. 
**p < 0.05. 
***p < 0.01. 
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The magnitude of the spillover on geographically close areas in 
the short term ranges from a loss of between 52 and 219 employees in 
areas neighboring EZs. Only the results estimated without control 
variables approaches statistical significance, where we can reject the 
null hypothesis of no spillovers at the ten percent level. In the longer 
term, the magnitude of the spillover on geographically close areas 
grows to a loss of between 185 (control variables) and 476 employees 
(no controls) at establishments in neighboring areas. Only the 
estimate without control variables is statistically different than zero. 
The magnitude of the spillover effect on employment at 
establishments in areas that are economically similar and located in 
the same city as EZ areas is larger than the estimated effect for 
geographically close areas. Areas that were qualified for the EZ 
program, but not included in an application experience a decline of 
between 196 (controls) and 335 (no controls) employees in the short 
term, only statistically significant for the no controls specification. In 
the longer term, the size of the spillover on qualified areas grows to a 
loss of between 483 and 600 employees, and the estimates are quite 
precise—statistically significant in both specifications at the one 
percent level. Finally, testing for spillovers in areas that match 
characteristics of EZ designated areas through a propensity score 
shows large losses (between 328 and 1223 employees), but these 
results are imprecise, with only one specification yielding a result that 
is statistically meaningful at the ten percent level.17 
5.3. Spillovers in the retail and service industry 
Previous work (Hanson and Rohlin, 2011b) finds the 
Empowerment Zone tax incentives are most effective at attracting new 
establishments in the retail and service industries. Given the success 
of the program at attracting new retail and service establishments, we 
test for spillovers in adjacent areas in these industries separately.18 
The location-specific constraints of the program allow retail and service 
establishments to literally move across the street to gain eligibility for 
program benefits while not losing any of their local customer base. To 
test for spillovers in the retail and service industry, we run regressions 
as in Eqs. (1), (2) and (4), but limit the sample to establishments in 
these industries. 
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Table 6 shows estimation results for retail and service 
establishments measuring spillovers on both geographically and 
economically close areas (measured using qualifying areas and by 
propensity score). The results examining the retail and service sector 
separately show that indeed the negative spillover is strong in these 
industries. The EZ program is responsible for a loss of between 11.5 
(controls) and 16 (no controls) retail and service establishments in 
geographically close areas in the short term, and between 13 
(controls) and 19 (no controls) in the longer term, or about two-thirds 
the size of the total establishment loss. Looking across areas that are 
economically similar to EZs, shows that qualified areas lost between 14 
and 20 retail and service establishments in the short term (depending 
on the specification) and about the same amount in the longer term, 
again about two-thirds of the size of total establishment losses. All of 
these results are statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Spillover areas identified with the p-score method produce results that 
are similar in magnitude, but lose statistical significance in some 
specifications. 
Table 6. Spillover effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
establishments in the service and retail industries (standard errors clustered 
at city level in parenthesis). 
Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
− 16.00*** 
− 11.58*
* 
− 19.88
*** 
− 13.26*
** 
− 20.37
*** 
− 18.91*
** 
− 19.63
*** 
− 15.16*
** 
− 13.9
4** 
− 18.35 
− 21.29
*** 
− 23.86
* 
(4.853) (4.986) (4.182) (4.158) (2.588) (4.777) (2.666) (4.420) (5.937) (11.14) (6.336) (14.23) 
Poverty 
rate 
 43.36  36.76  − 4.580  6.714  172.2**  144.3** 
 (36.69)  (28.58)  (38.13)  (33.10)  (70.18)  (69.98) 
Unemploy
ment rate 
 39.25  36.63  123.0***  99.79***  − 48.33  − 36.10 
 (53.29)  (45.47)  (42.71)  (37.64)  (73.37)  (58.46) 
Percent 
non-white 
 
− 21.68*
* 
 
− 20.20*
** 
 6.436  5.262  27.69  28.30 
 (8.649)  (7.358)  (8.889)  (8.530)  (23.56)  (35.01) 
Percent 
with 
college 
degree 
 57.55**  50.34**  119.3***  106.7***  122.9*  140.5* 
 (24.30)  (23.05)  (36.41)  (31.69)  (70.30)  (74.31) 
Median 
income 
 
− 0.009
91 
 0.203  − 0.447  − 0.378  0.515  0.787 
 (0.359)  (0.301)  (0.568)  (0.523)  (0.861)  (0.824) 
Home 
ownership 
rate 
 
− 29.18*
* 
 
− 26.13*
* 
 − 20.36*  − 8.338  − 5.165  28.27 
 (12.81)  (12.16)  (10.73)  (11.73)  (28.80)  (45.05) 
Median 
house 
value 
 − 0.192*  − 0.152  
− 0.256*
** 
 
− 0.211*
* 
 − 0.166  − 0.353 
 (0.1000)  (0.0943)  (0.0879)  (0.0932)  (0.195)  (0.308) 
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Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Percent 
female 
household 
heads 
 13.85  5.924  − 43.16  − 44.72*  24.51  − 5.845 
 (25.85)  (20.24)  (28.27)  (24.09)  (42.63)  (48.56) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistanc
e 
 
− 91.60*
* 
 
− 79.97*
* 
 
− 81.38*
** 
 
− 71.00*
** 
 
− 151.2
** 
 − 78.70 
 (43.60)  (34.36)  (29.90)  (22.76)  (69.46)  (55.21) 
Average 
age of 
housing 
stock 
 − 2.912  − 3.337  − 2.402*  
− 4.015*
* 
 − 5.833  − 10.01 
 (1.911)  (2.075)  (1.239)  (1.687)  (4.257)  (8.669) 
Average 
age of 
housing 
stock 
squared 
 0.0121  0.0178  0.0170  0.0356**  0.0700  0.115 
 (0.0278)  (0.0281)  (0.0171)  (0.0177)  
(0.0552
) 
 (0.103) 
Constant 
54.93*** 151.5*** 49.86*** 150.7*** 50.14*** 151.6*** 42.24*** 168.3*** 
55.46**
* 
95.73 53.70*** 174.9 
(2.149) (33.77) (1.849) (36.79) (2.367) (37.25) (2.490) (47.24) (4.859) (72.78) (5.678) (136.5) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 
1980 to 
1990 
census 
trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observati
ons 
2312 2225 2312 2225 3171 3089 3171 3089 694 470 694 470 
R-
squared 
0.005 0.118 0.010 0.151 0.016 0.089 0.014 0.074 0.008 0.144 0.017 0.109 
Notes: Results include only firms in the retail and service industries. Regressions with 
EZgeo as treatment include only census tracts that border EZ (treatment) or EC 
(control) areas. Regressions with EZqual as treatment include only census tracts that 
qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the program. To qualify, 
applicants must have at least 20% of residents living in poverty and at least a 6.3% 
unemployment. Regressions with EZpscore as treatment include only tracts in the top 
decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at the city level) that did not 
actually receive an EZ or EC. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1.  
Table 7 shows estimates for spillovers on the retail and service 
industry using employment as the dependent variable. Again, these 
results suggest a negative spillover effect in both economically similar 
and geographically close areas from the EZ program. The magnitude of 
the negative spillover effect on employment in the retail and service 
sectors ranges from a loss of between 23 and 90 employees in the 
short term for geographically close areas, to a loss of between 430 and 
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456 employees in the longer term for areas with a close propensity 
score. As with the full sample employment results the retail and 
service sector results for employment are less precise; however we 
achieve statistical significance in 7 of 12 specifications. 
Table 7. Spillover effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
employees in the service and retail industries (standard errors clustered at 
city level in parenthesis). 
Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
− 89.56* 23.36 − 264.5*** − 179.2** − 138.5*** − 140.8** − 274.1*** − 307.6*** − 42.77 − 62.90 − 431.5** − 456.1 
(48.10) (64.48) (64.08) (90.85) (40.81) (55.58) (70.70) (106.6) (95.59) (96.01) (170.8) (302.2) 
Poverty rate 
 − 125.0  41.22  81.93  298.1  589.5  1524 
 (372.8)  (565.7)  (437.5)  (615.4)  (861.8)  (1496) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 − 1563*  453.6  10.02  1895**  − 1531*  − 889.0 
 (829.2)  (1104)  (504.0)  (811.5)  (888.1)  (1708) 
Percent non-
white 
 − 136.9  − 361.2***  99.08  23.16  − 37.21  241.6 
 (95.43)  (133.8)  (139.9)  (177.5)  (296.8)  (728.3) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 1094*  657.7  − 1055  − 1167  − 72.07  1870 
 (562.5)  (574.7)  (1278)  (993.5)  (777.1)  (1459) 
Median income 
 − 6.599  2.139  11.57  14.82  − 12.07  0.775 
 (5.083)  (5.879)  (11.80)  (11.32)  (11.83)  (18.96) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 58.83  − 592.0**  − 291.0  − 632.4**  65.08  220.5 
 (246.6)  (236.8)  (253.9)  (288.3)  (248.5)  (978.5) 
Median house 
value 
 − 3.338**  − 3.570**  − 2.973*  − 4.107*  − 1.899  − 6.856 
 (1.616)  (1.733)  (1.602)  (2.270)  (1.867)  (6.103) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 − 116.4  164.9  − 498.4  − 195.6  965.7*  1011 
 (292.4)  (420.6)  (314.2)  (393.2)  (511.2)  (1098) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 240.0  − 992.3  − 271.2  − 1623***  − 1685**  − 2357 
 (573.8)  (844.6)  (318.6)  (513.7)  (651.4)  (1743) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 − 39.81*  − 68.01**  − 42.16*  − 112.8**  − 50.99  − 210.8 
 (20.84)  (29.19)  (23.33)  (47.54)  (34.30)  (178.3) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 0.241  0.463  0.401  1.187***  0.660  2.663 
 (0.302)  (0.439)  (0.311)  (0.437)  (0.506)  (2.148) 
Constant 
438.0*** 1942*** 662.1*** 2938*** 341.1*** 1517** 517.6*** 3143** 384.1*** 1581** 827.2*** 4152 
(28.13) (422.1) (39.25) (615.0) (39.21) (635.4) (69.11) (1334) (87.11) (791.2) (162.9) (2855) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 2312 2225 2312 2225 3171 3089 3171 3089 694 470 694 470 
R-squared 0.001 0.062 0.005 0.100 0.003 0.024 0.004 0.028 0.000 0.121 0.010 0.073 
Notes: Results include only firms in the retail and service industries. Regressions with 
EZgeo as treatment include only census tracts that border EZ (treatment) or EC 
(control) areas. Regressions with EZqual as treatment include only census tracts that 
qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the program. To qualify, 
applicants must have at least 20% of residents living in poverty and at least a 6.3% 
unemployment. Regressions with EZpscore as treatment include only tracts in the top 
decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at the city level) that did not 
actually receive an EZ or EC. 
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*p < 0.1. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
5.4. Robustness of primary results 
The primary concern with the results in Table 4, Table 5, 
Table 6 and Table 7 is that there may be some unobserved variables 
correlated with being near an EZ that are also correlated with the 
number of establishments or employment. We believe our identification 
strategy of using areas close to EC locations eliminates many of these 
concerns, as both our control and treatment areas are not part of the 
original application process; however, it is still possible we have not 
adequately accounted for all possible missing variables. To further 
explore the robustness of our primary results, we implement the 
strategy in Udry (1996) that examines how adding control variables 
changes the coefficient of interest. The idea is that if we add control 
variables that are relevant to how the number of establishments change 
and it does not change our results, this provides some evidence that 
missing variables would not change the results either. This is further 
strengthened by adding in all cross-products of control variables and 
their squared terms to ensure we have the proper specification. This 
robustness check involves re-estimating Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) as: 
𝛥𝑌 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1(𝐸𝑍𝑐𝑙𝑜𝑠𝑒) + ∑ 𝑋𝑖 + 𝑋𝑖
2 + 𝑋𝑖𝑋𝑗≠𝑖 + 𝜀
𝑁
𝑖=1
.  
equation(5) 
 
Where EZclose represents one of the three types of closeness we 
describe in Eqs. (1), (2) and (4) depending on the specification, and X 
represents all control variables in the previous regressions. 
Table 8 shows the results of estimating Eq. (5) for the various 
types of spillovers we measure in the short and long term and for both 
the number of establishments and number of employees. The number 
of establishment results is extremely similar to the results with 
controls in Table 3, and we cannot reject the null hypothesis that they 
are the same in either the case of geographic spillovers or spillovers in 
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qualified areas. These results are also quite similar to the no controls 
results, although we are able to reject the null that the coefficients are 
the same in one specification. The propensity score results do not hold 
up to adding these additional square and cross product terms, 
although they actually start to lose significance when adding any 
controls. This is likely due to the much smaller sample size and 
addition of several variables straining the degrees of freedom—it 
seems to be asking too much of the model. The employment results 
are not nearly as robust—in many cases, the sign flips and the 
magnitudes are much different from specifications with no controls or 
some controls. We still cannot reject the null hypothesis that these 
coefficients are equal, but this is because of the large standard errors 
on the estimates with squares and cross products. 
Table 8. Robustness of primary findings to adding additional control 
variables. 
 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term Long-term Short-term Long-term 
Short-
term 
Long-term 
Number of establishments (EZ coefficient) 
No controls − 24.23*** − 30.28*** − 28.29*** − 28.48*** − 19.38** − 33.15*** 
Standard controls − 15.21*** − 18.17*** − 25.05*** − 20.70*** − 27.96* − 36.48 
Cross products and squares − 13.92** − 15.50*** − 25.75*** − 19.69*** 1.53 − 2.45 
No controls = Cross products 
and squares 
Cannot 
reject 
Reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot reject 
Standard controls = Cross 
products and squares 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Reject Cannot reject 
 
Number of employees (EZ coefficient) 
No controls − 219.5* − 476.8** − 335.4*** − 599.9*** − 328.2 − 889.9** 
Standard controls − 52.39 − 185.4 − 196.7 − 483.1*** − 612.7 − 1223 
Cross products and squares 62.51 12.40 − 144.8 − 383.4** − 232.0 − 49.81 
No controls = Cross products 
and squares 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot reject 
Standard controls = Cross 
products and squares 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot 
reject 
Cannot reject 
Cross products and squares regressions follow Eq. (5) in the text and control for the 
following variables, their squared terms, their 1980–1990 trends, and all cross 
products: poverty rate, unemployment rate, percent non-white, percent with college 
degree, median income, home ownership rate, median house value, percent female 
household heads, percent receiving public assistance, average age of housing stock. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1. 
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5.5. Using an improper comparison group: all other 
census tracts 
As a way to see how the choice of comparison group matters 
(see Greenstone et al. (2010) for an excellent example measuring the 
spillover effects from new manufacturing facilities), we estimate the 
spillover effects from the EZ program by comparing both economically 
and geographically close areas to all other census tracts in the U.S. 
(excluding tracts that actually received a designation). Our estimating 
equation for this comparison is: 
ΔY = α + β1 (EZclose) + X
′δ + ε, if EZ, EC ≠ 1 
equation(6) 
 
where EZclose equals one for tracts that are either geographically or 
economically close to actual EZs depending on the specification, and 
zero otherwise. These regressions include the full set of census tracts 
outside of EZ/EC areas, with no attempt to construct a comparison 
area that is similar to the spillover prone areas. 
Table 9 shows the results of estimating Eq. (6) across the 
various spillover areas in both the short and longer term estimated 
with and without control variables with the number of establishments 
as the dependent variable. These results highlight that it is difficult to 
determine if any spillovers exist from the EZ program when using an 
improper comparison group. For both the geographically close and 
qualified areas, the sign of the estimates switches depending on 
whether control variables are included. The magnitude of the 
estimates ranges from increasing the number of establishments by 20 
in the long term to decreasing the number of establishments by 18 in 
the short term in qualified areas. The estimates testing for spillovers 
using the propensity score to trim the spillover group all show a 
positive spillover effect of the program, but the magnitude ranges 
anywhere from an increase of 2 to 20 establishments. Statistical 
significance of these estimates also varies considerably across the 
specifications. 
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Table 9. Spillover effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
establishments measured against all other census tracts (standard 
errors clustered at city level in parenthesis). 
Spillover 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
− 4.190 3.010 − 2.345 10.61*** − 18.04*** 6.334** − 13.46*** 19.97*** 4.177* 11.29** 2.539 20.42*** 
(6.015) (3.056) (5.268) (2.849) (2.898) (3.186) (2.286) (2.846) (5.115) (4.689) (4.031) (4.268) 
Poverty rate 
 83.54***  129.3***  83.36***  128.8***  83.05***  128.5*** 
 (10.98)  (12.13)  (10.98)  (12.13)  (10.97)  (12.12) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 − 20.81  − 75.82***  − 21.15  − 76.78***  − 19.25  − 72.53*** 
 (23.29)  (23.11)  (23.22)  (23.09)  (23.14)  (23.01) 
Percent non-
white 
 − 8.870***  − 3.606  − 8.681***  − 3.031  − 8.395***  − 2.845 
 (2.793)  (2.838)  (2.807)  (2.843)  (2.812)  (2.846) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 32.49***  29.19***  32.16***  28.19***  32.08***  28.57*** 
 (6.297)  (6.807)  (6.310)  (6.819)  (6.311)  (6.818) 
Median income 
 0.520***  0.369***  0.521***  0.370***  0.517***  0.366*** 
 (0.0868)  (0.0850)  (0.0867)  (0.0849)  (0.0868)  (0.0851) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 − 12.39***  13.09***  − 12.53***  12.65***  − 12.46***  12.92*** 
 (3.671)  (4.042)  (3.665)  (4.036)  (3.666)  (4.037) 
Median house 
value 
 − 0.221***  − 0.268***  − 0.222***  − 0.272***  − 0.222***  − 0.269*** 
 (0.0217)  (0.0227)  (0.0216)  (0.0227)  (0.0217)  (0.0227) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 − 36.90***  − 85.46***  − 37.31***  − 86.74***  − 37.01***  − 85.57*** 
 (8.678)  (8.796)  (8.685)  (8.787)  (8.677)  (8.792) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 − 31.52**  − 33.10**  − 35.84**  − 46.46***  − 36.42**  − 40.86** 
 (15.61)  (16.64)  (16.46)  (17.31)  (15.95)  (17.07) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 1.670***  0.519**  1.678***  0.544**  1.655***  0.486** 
 (0.195)  (0.217)  (0.194)  (0.217)  (0.196)  (0.218) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 − 0.0543***  − 0.0461***  − 0.0545***  − 0.0466***  − 0.0540***  − 0.0453*** 
 (0.00399)  (0.00415)  (0.00398)  (0.00415)  (0.00400)  (0.00416) 
Constant 
64.56*** 51.92*** 77.97*** 89.05*** 64.56*** 52.37*** 77.96*** 90.46*** 64.56*** 52.49*** 77.96*** 89.98*** 
(0.359) (4.645) (0.433) (5.254) (0.359) (4.682) (0.433) (5.277) (0.359) (4.679) (0.433) (5.282) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 
R-squared 0.033 0.119 0.022 0.122 0.034 0.119 0.022 0.123 0.033 0.119 0.022 0.122 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes: EZgeo results include only census tracts that border EZs in the treatment, but 
includes all other tracts (except for actual EZ or EC areas) in the control group. EZqual 
results include only tracts that qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules 
of the program and were located in EZ cities in the treatment, but includes all other 
census tracts (except actual EZ or EC areas) in the control group. EZpscore results 
include only tracts in the top decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at 
the city level) and were located in EZ cities in the treatment, but includes all other 
tracts (except for actual EZ or EC areas) in the control. 
***p < 0.01. 
**p < 0.05. 
*p < 0.1. 
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Table 10 displays the results of estimating Eq. (6) across the 
various spillover areas in both the short and longer term estimated 
with and without control variables using employees as the dependent 
variable. Ten of the 12 specifications produce results that suggest 
positive employment spillovers for neighboring or economically close 
areas, while only two suggest a negative effect. The size of the effect 
estimated this way is substantial, suggesting gains of between 230 
and 360 employees in geographically close areas and between 170 and 
380 in economically close areas, depending on the specification. All 
except one of the positive results is statistically significant at 
conventional levels. 
Table 10. Spillover effects of targeted tax incentives on the number of 
employees measured against all other census tracts (standard errors 
clustered at city level in parenthesis). 
Spill over 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
230.2** 281.2*** 245.3 362.7** − 38.80 173.6** − 134.7* 199.2** 239.1*** 380.8*** 169.1** 323.5** 
(98.17) (95.31) (157.8) (160.9) (74.21) (83.49) (73.61) (94.70) (75.39) (106.2) (84.84) (126.3) 
Poverty rate 
 357.5  1480***  355.4  1478***  343.5  1470*** 
 (257.4)  (300.4)  (257.8)  (301.9)  (258.1)  (301.6) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 1809*  790.6  1818*  804.0  1878*  860.1 
 (980.6)  (830.0)  (978.6)  (828.7)  (980.4)  (823.4) 
Percent non-
white 
 364.5***  257.3***  365.9***  258.2***  377.1***  265.7*** 
 (99.45)  (91.48)  (99.90)  (92.05)  (101.1)  (92.37) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 − 145.8  − 343.5  − 150.0  − 347.3  − 155.3  − 348.7 
 (214.2)  (228.9)  (214.7)  (228.4)  (214.6)  (228.6) 
Median income 
 7.036***  15.38***  7.131***  15.51***  7.017***  15.42*** 
 (1.508)  (1.967)  (1.509)  (1.964)  (1.509)  (1.969) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 − 671.2***  − 774.1***  − 677.1***  − 781.3***  − 675.3***  − 778.9*** 
 (147.5)  (131.6)  (147.7)  (131.4)  (147.6)  (131.5) 
Median house 
value 
 − 2.489***  − 4.150***  − 2.521***  − 4.187***  − 2.511***  − 4.168*** 
 (0.467)  (0.650)  (0.467)  (0.652)  (0.468)  (0.651) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 − 1374***  − 1371***  − 1382***  − 1379***  − 1375***  − 1369*** 
 (298.4)  (261.4)  (299.3)  (260.7)  (298.7)  (261.0) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 − 919.4**  − 1421***  − 995.6**  − 1500***  − 1047**  − 1503*** 
 (421.5)  (447.0)  (449.0)  (461.8)  (436.9)  (450.6) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 24.65***  16.38***  24.62***  16.29***  23.92***  15.61*** 
 (5.270)  (5.996)  (5.230)  (5.909)  (5.295)  (5.993) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 − 0.767***  − 0.880***  − 0.765***  − 0.876***  − 0.748***  − 0.860*** 
 (0.0932)  (0.112)  (0.0926)  (0.110)  (0.0937)  (0.112) 
Constant 
635.4*** 987.5*** 937.8*** 1450*** 635.5*** 996.1*** 938.0*** 1459*** 635.5*** 1003*** 938.0*** 1461*** 
(7.956) (145.8) (9.669) (138.1) (7.955) (147.9) (9.667) (140.4) (7.955) (148.2) (9.667) (140.2) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 57,119 45,916 
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Spill over 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
R-squared 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.034 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.034 0.013 0.027 0.008 0.034 
Notes: EZgeo results include only census tracts that border EZs in the treatment, but 
includes all other tracts (except for actual EZ or EC areas) in the control group. EZqual 
results include only tracts that qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules 
of the program and were located in EZ cities in the treatment, but includes all other 
census tracts (except actual EZ or EC areas) in the control group. EZpscore results 
include only tracts in the top decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at 
the city level) and were located in EZ cities in the treatment, but includes all other 
tracts (except for actual EZ or EC areas) in the control. 
**p < 0.05. 
***p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.1. 
Using all other census tracts as a comparison group for spillover 
prone areas is inappropriate because these areas differ along 
observable dimensions as shown in Table 1, and are also likely to differ 
along unobservable dimensions as the treated (spillover prone) areas 
were not included in the original EZ application although they were 
either qualified, geographically close, or both. Results in 
Table 9 and Table 10 highlight that failing to carefully consider 
observable and unobservable dimensions of a comparison group can 
produce results that are biased and inconsistent. 
5.6. Comparing spillovers and program effects 
The existence of spillovers from spatially targeted 
redevelopment programs has two primary implications: geographically 
and economically close areas of the same city make a poor comparison 
group to evaluate economic redevelopment programs, and analysis of 
these programs may want to consider measuring targeted area gains 
net of losses in areas subject to spillovers. The negative spillovers we 
find for census tracts adjacent to targeted areas imply using them as a 
comparison group will cause upward bias in estimates of the program 
effect. To demonstrate the severity of the bias, we use the spillover 
areas as a comparison group to find the effect of the EZ program on 
treated areas by running the following regression: 
ΔY = α + β1 (EZ) + X
′δ + ε, if EZ or EZclose = 1. 
equation(7) 
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We estimate Eq. (7) using both the geographically and 
economically close variants of EZclose. Table 11 shows estimation 
results using the spillover areas as a control to measure the effect of 
the EZ program on treated areas with establishments as the 
dependent variable, Table 12 shows the results for employment. 
Table 11. Effect of the EZ program on the number of establishments 
measured using spillover areas as controls (standard errors clustered at city 
level in parenthesis). 
Comparison 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
12.57** 18.36*** 18.39*** 22.99*** 22.90*** 24.48*** 27.59*** 27.35*** 6.855 14.38* 14.57*** 15.48** 
(6.316) (6.850) (5.674) (5.450) (3.678) (4.959) (3.401) (3.917) (5.888) (8.336) (4.970) (6.115) 
Poverty rate 
 126.8**  89.71*  121.6**  100.4**  136.2*  106.6* 
 (53.67)  (46.97)  (57.14)  (45.29)  (71.31)  (58.02) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 17.63  7.499  79.71*  51.50  33.13  33.23 
 (55.36)  (45.49)  (42.76)  (31.54)  (56.82)  (43.76) 
Percent non-
white 
 − 40.60***  − 29.64**  − 26.23**  − 20.39*  − 32.51**  − 25.79* 
 (13.27)  (12.05)  (12.29)  (11.05)  (16.57)  (15.35) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 − 9.441  8.234  121.5*  124.7**  44.42  85.02 
 (55.39)  (55.31)  (66.09)  (62.19)  (91.05)  (88.25) 
Median income 
 0.390  − 0.0123  0.821  0.715  1.423  1.204 
 (0.581)  (0.463)  (0.974)  (0.721)  (1.207)  (0.944) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 − 53.40**  − 45.09**  − 33.24**  − 25.32*  − 67.62***  − 57.36** 
 (20.96)  (18.88)  (15.03)  (13.04)  (25.54)  (23.46) 
Median house 
value 
 − 0.0956  − 0.0973  − 0.156  − 0.114  − 0.214  − 0.191 
 (0.145)  (0.114)  (0.122)  (0.102)  (0.179)  (0.141) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 18.21  − 29.62  − 10.77  − 35.77  − 9.743  − 51.98 
 (43.80)  (38.52)  (36.21)  (31.14)  (49.31)  (42.22) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 − 192.4***  − 144.7**  − 159.9***  − 111.5**  − 189.8***  − 139.7* 
 (57.23)  (68.15)  (44.56)  (52.79)  (58.37)  (71.79) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 − 0.198  − 1.370  − 1.414  − 1.665  − 0.523  − 0.428 
 (3.958)  (3.434)  (2.587)  (2.222)  (4.352)  (3.701) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 − 0.0188  0.00923  0.00357  0.0149  − 0.0120  − 0.00557 
 (0.0629)  (0.0549)  (0.0405)  (0.0352)  (0.0691)  (0.0592) 
Constant 
47.87*** 104.7* 35.97*** 122.7** 37.54*** 80.97 26.76*** 72.77* 53.59*** 92.04 39.79*** 83.11 
(5.394) (60.13) (4.725) (48.36) (1.654) (54.08) (1.305) (39.15) (4.886) (77.63) (3.851) (57.35) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1816 1725 1816 1725 2709 2593 2709 2593 1690 1518 1690 1518 
R-squared 0.002 0.085 0.005 0.097 0.014 0.096 0.024 0.116 0.001 0.089 0.003 0.110 
Robust standard errors in parentheses. 
 
Notes: EZgeo results include only census tracts that border EZs in the control, 
and includes all EZ tracts as treatment. EZqual results include only tracts that 
qualified for Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the program and 
were located in EZ cities in the control, and all EZ tracts as treatment. EZpscore 
results include only tracts in the top decile of the propensity score distribution 
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(estimated at the city level) and located in EZ cities in the control, and all EZ 
tracts as treatment. 
**p < 0.05. 
***p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.1. 
 
Table 12. Effect of the EZ program on the number of employees measured 
using spillover areas as controls (standard errors clustered at city level in 
parenthesis). 
Comparison 
area 
EZgeo 
 
EZqual 
 
EZpscore 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
Short-term 
 
Long-term 
 
EZclose 
81.11 152.9 233.3 279.7 376.6*** 378.2*** 630.2*** 607.0*** 164.9* 211.9 421.6*** 436.6*** 
(115.3) (162.4) (191.8) (243.8) (75.94) (110.1) (88.92) (112.8) (88.94) (147.5) (111.9) (158.8) 
Poverty rate 
 1357  3028**  2524**  3748***  1742  2723* 
 (981.6)  (1363)  (1226)  (1323)  (1231)  (1474) 
Unemployment 
rate 
 982.4  666.5  284.2  1067  910.9  1223 
 (1209)  (1312)  (1342)  (1105)  (1205)  (1291) 
Percent non-
white 
 − 548.0**  − 1021***  − 435.8*  − 803.7***  − 487.6*  − 878.2*** 
 (217.9)  (268.6)  (229.2)  (250.3)  (253.9)  (326.4) 
Percent with 
college degree 
 1092  229.6  950.2  1559  1816  2133 
 (1129)  (1197)  (1720)  (1650)  (1844)  (1842) 
Median income 
 4.752  6.998  41.30  49.32**  28.80  26.96 
 (12.01)  (13.22)  (26.14)  (23.17)  (23.20)  (24.58) 
Home 
ownership rate 
 − 712.2*  − 1152**  − 201.9  − 522.1  − 834.1  − 1383** 
 (428.4)  (510.0)  (311.2)  (354.1)  (515.9)  (612.0) 
Median house 
value 
 0.0397  0.339  − 1.493  − 2.946  − 2.481  − 4.747 
 (2.839)  (4.502)  (2.078)  (2.335)  (2.850)  (3.187) 
Percent female 
household 
heads 
 165.8  9.795  690.0  489.9  59.26  − 277.6 
 (738.4)  (789.9)  (810.6)  (735.3)  (806.1)  (850.6) 
Percent 
receiving 
public 
assistance 
 − 1907*  − 3581***  − 1306  − 2803***  − 1863*  − 3477*** 
 (1043)  (1273)  (880.4)  (1025)  (1055)  (1293) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
 26.60  29.61  2.107  − 15.31  − 14.84  − 27.71 
 (75.97)  (105.4)  (56.25)  (63.69)  (78.66)  (98.43) 
Average age of 
housing stock 
squared 
 − 0.904  − 0.854  − 0.375  − 0.0285  − 0.175  0.0663 
 (1.223)  (1.676)  (0.872)  (0.987)  (1.251)  (1.550) 
Constant 
547.8*** 887.0 733.1*** 1345 252.3*** − 862.9 336.3*** − 420.2 464.0*** 723.8 544.9*** 1651 
(94.86) (1142) (173.2) (1608) (38.33) (1478) (33.69) (1309) (60.09) (1327) (75.74) (1590) 
City fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Includes 1980 
to 1990 
census trends 
 Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations 1816 1725 1816 1725 2709 2593 2709 2593 1690 1518 1690 1518 
R-squared 0.000 0.038 0.001 0.053 0.009 0.038 0.019 0.072 0.001 0.044 0.004 0.068 
Notes: EZgeo results include only census tracts that border EZs in the control, and 
include all EZ tracts as treatment. EZqual results include only tracts that qualified for 
Empowerment Zone status under the rules of the program and were located in EZ 
cities in the control, and all EZ tracts as treatment. EZpscore results include only tracts 
in the top decile of the propensity score distribution (estimated at the city level) and 
located in EZ cities in the control, and all EZ tracts as treatment. 
***p < 0.01. 
*p < 0.1. 
**p < 0.05. 
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These results highlight the bias that occurs when choosing an 
area prone to spillovers to measure the effect of the EZ program. 
Measuring the program effect using the spillover prone areas as a 
comparison group, the EZ has a sizable positive effect—creating 
between 12 and 18 establishments in geographically close areas in the 
short term, and between 18 and 23 establishments over the longer 
term (depending on the specification). The biased measure of EZ 
success is statistically significant in all cases using geographically close 
areas as a comparison group. Measuring the program effect using 
economically close areas as the comparison group suggests a similar 
positive effect of the EZ program—an increase of between 6 and 25 
firms in the short term (depending on comparison group and 
specification) and between 14 and 28 in the longer term (depending 
on comparison group and specification). All but two of the results 
using economically similar areas as a comparison group are 
statistically significant at conventional levels, and one of those is 
statistically significant at the ten percent level. 
Results for employment generated by the EZ program using the 
spillover prone areas as a comparison group are also positive across 
the board. These results suggest substantial gains from the EZ 
program, although the estimates are less precise than the 
establishment results. Using geographically close areas as a 
comparison group suggests gains of between 81 and 152 employees in 
the short term, and between 233 and 279 in the longer term, but none 
of these is statistically meaningful. Using economically close areas as 
the comparison group produces larger estimates—an increase of 
between 164 and 378 employees in the short term, and between 421 
and 630 in the longer term. These results are also more precise as all 
but two specifications produce statistically significant results. 
Subtracting the negative effect on the spillover prone areas 
from the biased estimates in Table 9 and Table 10 (using only 
estimates of both spillovers and program effects that are statistically 
significant), the net effect on the number of establishments from the 
program is actually negative in six of the nine cases (between zero and 
negative one in two cases). Under the most pessimistic estimates, the 
net effect of the program is a loss of about 18 establishments. Under 
the most optimistic estimates, the net effect is an increase of about 7 
establishments—a gain of 27 in EZ areas, and a loss of 20 in spillover 
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prone areas (using the long term results from the EZ qualified areas 
estimated with control variables). 
The net effect on employment (again using only statistically 
significant estimates) is positive in three cases, but gains from the 
program are almost completely offset by losses in spillover areas. The 
largest net gain is 124 employees (using the long term results from 
the EZ qualified areas estimated with controls)—a gain of 607 in EZ 
areas, with a loss of 483 in spillover prone areas. The most pessimistic 
estimate is a net loss of 469 employees (using the long term results 
from the propensity score estimated without controls)—890 employees 
lost in spillover areas, compared with only 421 gained in EZ areas. 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
This paper offers an empirical test of spillovers from a 
prominent spatially targeted economic redevelopment program. 
Estimates suggest that the EZ program is responsible for considerable 
negative spillovers on neighboring and economically similar areas, 
both in terms of the number of establishments located in these areas 
and employment at local establishments. We find that losses are 
especially strong in the retail and service industries. 
Given the EZ program uses tight geographic targeting in densely 
populated urban areas, establishments can benefit by literally moving 
across the street into the EZ to enjoy the benefits of the program 
without incurring relocation costs associated with moving further from 
a customer base, employees, or losing other advantages of the 
immediate location. Establishments' relocating from spillover prone 
areas into EZ areas seems to be at least some of the cause of 
spillovers, as Hanson and Rohlin (2011a) show that the EZ is 
responsible for attracting new business establishments. 
Spillovers caused by relocation suggest a zero net effect from 
the program; however, some of our estimates suggest a negative net 
effect of the program. Negative net effects could be the result of 
spillovers causing job (and establishment) destruction in neighboring 
and similar areas, possibly through increased competition from 
establishments subsidized by the EZ program or factor price increases. 
The D&B data does not differentiate establishments and jobs that 
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move from those being destroyed, but, if the goal of policy makers is 
to induce relocation, it seems that even this modest objective may 
come at a cost of destroying jobs and establishments in areas that 
compete with targeted places. 
It is still possible that redevelopment programs are successful 
even if the only measureable outcomes in targeted areas come at the 
expense of neighboring areas.19 Programs may provide better access 
to jobs for those most in need, or retail access for those living in 
isolation. In this way, the benefits from an additional establishment 
may be greater in targeted neighborhoods than they are in 
neighboring areas. Of course, measuring success by this type of metric 
is harder to imagine when spillovers occur in economically, not only 
geographically, close areas as we show here, but it remains a 
possibility. 
Our findings suggest that spillovers should be an important 
consideration for policy makers when deciding how and where to 
target redevelopment programs. Accounting for costs and benefits 
over a broader geographic (and economically similar) area may be 
appropriate, as any gains in targeted areas may come at the expense 
of areas prone to spillovers from the policy. Our findings also suggest 
caution when choosing a comparison group to evaluate economic 
redevelopment policies. Spillovers from these policies on 
geographically and economically close areas suggest that they are not 
useful as a comparison group for evaluation because they themselves 
are affected by the treatment so that using them violates the no 
interference between units assumption necessary for unbiased 
estimates of the program effect. 
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1 This estimate includes dollars allocated for Renewal Community and 
Enterprise Community areas in addition to the larger and more 
generous Empowerment Zone program. The annual tax expenditure 
budget estimates the forgone revenue associated with these programs 
at about $1.7 billion annually, substantially lower than the HUD value 
estimates. Some of the difference between the HUD and tax 
expenditure estimates might be explained by direct spending involved 
in the program through social service block grants, although these 
grants totaled less than $1 billion and were only allocated once at the 
start of the program. 
2 If there are positive spillover effects on comparison areas, then the effect of 
these programs would be underestimated. If there are negative effects 
on comparison areas, then the effect of these programs would be 
overestimated. 
3 EZ areas are defined by groupings of 1990 census tracts. The Census 
Bureau defines census tracts as “statistical subdivisions of counties”. 
Census Tracts average 4000 residents and range from 2500 to 8000 
residents. Every Metropolitan Area or Urbanized Area in the United 
States is completely divided into census tracts. Since the primary 
concern in defining tracts is the population, the land area of tracts 
varies widely. 
4 There is a literature that examines the effect of U.S. state-level 
geographically targeted incentive programs that we would also 
describe as finding mixed results. Several studies find positive effects 
including Papke (1994), O'Keefe (2004), and Billings (2008), and 
others finding small or no net effects including Boarnet and Bogart 
(1996), Bondonio and Engberg (2000), Greenbaum and Engberg 
(2004), Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007), Elvery (2009), and 
Neumark and Kolko (2010). See Buss (2001) for a comprehensive 
review of this literature. For recent evaluations of similar international 
programs see Hilber et al. (2011), Zhang (2011) and Accetturo and de 
Blasio (2012). 
5 Ham et al. (2011) also examine the federal EC program, and state 
Enterprise Zone programs using a similar methodology. They find 
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substantial positive and statistically significant effects in almost all 
cases. 
6 The incentives to invest in capital are an increased expensing allowance 
that applies to a broader set of purchases than typical expensing and 
allowing establishments to postpone the reporting of gains from capital 
sold in the EZ. 
7 Social service block grants subsidize a variety of services including: day 
care for children, employment services, counseling, legal services, 
transportation, education, and substance abuse recovery. 
8 It could be that the initial application did not include geographically or 
economically close areas because they were more/less likely to be 
successful in the absence of incentives. If this is the case, there is still 
a selection effect; however, using areas that were qualified but left out 
of the initial application as the control group eliminates it. 
9 If, however, ECs did result in a negative spillover our method would 
understate the spillover caused near EZ areas; if the ECs resulted in a 
positive spillover, our method would overstate the spillover caused 
near EZ areas. 
10 The bias from comparing with all other areas could work both ways. If 
areas surrounding EZs are more likely to grow faster because they 
have a worse starting point, results would be bias toward finding 
positive spillovers (or less negative). If areas surrounding EZs are 
more likely to continue to decline, results would be biased toward 
finding negative spillovers (or less positive). Estimates using all other 
census tracts as a comparison group show a large positive spillover 
from the EZ onto neighboring areas. 
11 We stop at 2000 because in 2001 more cities began receiving EZ status, 
effectively making some of our comparison areas treated areas. 
12 We also tried estimating a propensity score model using probit 
regressions, these results have even fewer statistically significant 
variables than the linear probability results presented here. 
13 Although the D&B does not contain all business activity in the U.S., the 
omissions from the data are considered sufficiently random so that the 
data is representative of the spatial distribution of the business activity 
(Holmes, 1998 and Rosenthal and Strange, 2003). 
14 The federal government also offers a less generous Work Opportunity or 
Welfare to Work tax credit to establishments outside of the EZ area 
who employ youth (aged 18 to 24) living in EZ areas. These tax credits 
are only available for the first two years of employment, while the 
standard EZ employment credit is available regardless of employee 
tenure. 
15 Coefficients for the change in 1980 to 1990 census tract attributes are 
available upon request from the authors. 
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16 As a robustness check, we test for spillover effects using the top quartile 
of census tracts in the propensity score distribution as the treatment. 
These results show a loss of between 17 and 19 establishments in the 
short term and between 16 and 23 establishments in the longer term, 
statistically significant in all specifications with or without using control 
variables. 
17 We also estimate spillover effects using logs. The primary reason for doing 
so is that the level regressions assume that census tracts across areas 
close to EZs and ECs should gain the same number of firms or 
employees in the absence of the program, and the log regressions 
assume that the growth rates should be the same. The log regressions 
show the same sign and statistical significance as the results in 
Table 4 and Table 5, with magnitudes ranging from a loss of 15–77% 
of firms depending on the spillover area, the time elapsed, and the 
controls. 
18 The effect on industries outside the service and retail sector is negative 
and between a half to a third of the effect on the service and retail 
sector, depending of the specification and the time interval. These 
results are also statistically significant in nearly every case. 
19 It may also be that benefits and spillovers manifest in other outcome 
measures such as property values. We attempt to measure spillovers 
on property values using 1990–2000 census tract median property 
values as the dependent variable with the same identification strategy. 
These results are quite erratic, changing sign, magnitude and 
statistical significance depending on the specification and comparison 
area we use. This may be a function of the quality of these data, as 
property values are self-reported in the census. It may also be that 
there is a heterogeneous spillover for properties based on distance or 
access to EZ areas. 
 
